

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0323

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 8 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE JUNE 8 PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,
ACTING CANADIAN REP (PUDDINGTON) AND SOVIET REP (TARASOV)
DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENTS. PUDDINGTON'S PRESENTATION
IS BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY. IN HIS STATEMENT, SOVIET REP
FORMALLY PROVIDED THE EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN
INITIATIVE OF APRIL 19. THE RESPONSE CONSISTED OF A
CRITIQUE OF THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE DEEMED
TO HAVE LEFT INTACT THE OLD WESTERN POSITIONS ON ALL
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS AND, THUS, TO BE UNSUITABLE AS A BASIS
FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
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AGREEMENTS, AND NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS. TARASOV
CHARACTERIZED THE LATTER AS A SIGNIFICANT
COMPROMISE EFFORT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WESTERN
INTERESTS. ALTHOUGH EASTERN PARTICIPANTS REMAINED
CONVINCED OF THE SOUNDNESS OF THEIR ORIGINAL
REDUCTION APPROACH, SOVIET REP SAID THAT THEY HAD
DECIDED TO ADVANCE FRESH PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO

GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS A NEW IMPULSE AND TO FOCUS THEM ON THE WORKING OUT OF CONCRETE AGREEMENTS. TARASOV EMPHASIZED THAT, AS A STARTING POINT, ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY MANPOWER STRENGTH OF EAST AND WEST IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS ALREADY APPROXIMATELY EQUAL. AN INFORMAL DELEGATION TRANSLATION OF THE FULL TEXT OF SOVIET REP'S STATEMENT, WHICH WAS DELIVERED IN RUSSIAN, FOLLOWS BELOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

RESPECTED MR. CHAIRMAN,

1. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE WORK IN VIENNA THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN PROSECUTING AN ACTIVE AND CONSISTENT LINE IN ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE ON A MUTUAL BASIS WITH THE WEST AGREEMENTS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING AND FURTHER LIMITING THE MILITARY POTENTIALS WHICH ALL THE STATES DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DISPOSE OF IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

2. THE PROGRAMME WHICH WE PUT FORWARD IN NOVEMBER 1973 ENVISAGING THE NECESSITY THAT EACH STATE DIRECT PARTICIPANT SHOULD CARRY OUT AN EQUIVALENT CONTRIBUTION IN THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS CORRESPONDING TO THE DIMENSIONS
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OF ITS ARMED FORCES WAS AND REMAINS THE ONLY REAL MEANS OF SOLVING THE TASK WHICH HAS BEEN SET. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAMME WOULD GUARANTEE AN EFFECTIVE REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WEST AND THE EAST IN THIS REGION OF THE WORLD AND WOULD IN A DECISIVE MANNER ASSIST MILITARY DETENTE. IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE DIFFICULTIES CREATED BY THE NATO STATES IN THE WAY OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WOULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN

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COMPLETED IN 1977. ALMOST 300,000 MEN WOULD HAVE PUT DOWN THEIR GUNS AND WOULD HAVE BEGUN PEACEFUL CREATIVE WORK TO THE BENEFIT OF THEIR PEOPLES. ENTIRE MOUNTAINS OF WEAPONRY OVERFILLING THE ARSENALS OF THE STATES IN THIS REGION WOULD HAVE BEEN BROKEN UP AND REDIRECTED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. SUCH HIGHLY IMPORTANT TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AS GROUND FORCES, AVIATION AND ALSO NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS, WOULD HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION. ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WHICH WERE AT THEIR DISPOSAL WOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN REDUCED. TODAY, WE WOULD HAVE HAD THE POSSIBILITY, IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF DETENTE AND INCREASED CONFIDENCE, TO SOLVE HERE NEW, SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER REACHING TASKS TO CONVERT CENTRAL EUROPE INTO A REGION OF STABLE PEACE, FREE FROM THE RISK OF MILITARY CATASTROPHES. THE SUCCESS OF OUR FIRST STEPS WOULD HAVE INSPIRED, UNDOUBTEDLY, OTHER EUROPEAN STATES AND GOVERNMENTS ALSO TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHICH WOULD SET MILITARY DETENTE ON A MORE CONFIDENTIAL

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STABLE AND WIDE BASIS.

3. WE HAVE BEEN AND REMAIN, CONVINCED THAT OUR ORIGINAL PROGRAMME IS REALISTIC THAT IT IS FULLY IMPLEMENTABLE AND THAT ITS REALISATION WOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE STATES, WOULD NOT GIVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO ANYBODY AND WOULD NOT EITHER IN THE WHOLE OR IN ITS INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS VIOLATE THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS BEEN EVOLVED IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPE AND WHICH HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN CHARACTERISED BY APPROXIMATE EQUALITY.

4. DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE DEVELOPED AND ADDED TO THIS PROGRAMME WITH NEW AND, TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE, COMPROMISE PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TOWARDS, ON THE ONE HAND, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS AND ALSO THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN STATES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND, ON THE OTHER, AT NOT ALLOWING THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REDUCTIONS WHICH ARE ENVISAGED BY US TO BE DOWNGRADED. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PARTICULAR CONSIDERATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH, PERHAPS, DID NOT ALWAYS SEEM TO US JUSTIFIED, BUT DID NOT DIMINISH THE VOLUME OF THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY US, WE CONSISTENTLY ARGUED AGAINST THE INTENTIONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TO EXCLUDE FROM THE REDUCTION SUCH POWERFUL ELEMENTS OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED FORCES AS AIR FORCES, UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR MISSILE WEAPONS AND ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS.

5. ONE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED THAT THE NATO COUNTRIES WOULD IN THE END UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOCIALIST STATES, IN PUTTING A WIDE AND COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WERE NOT SEEKING

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ANY ADVANTAGES WHATSOEVER FOR THEMSELVES BUT WERE INTERESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE DEPTH AND SCALE OF THE WEAKENING OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION. HOWEVER THESE EXPECTATIONS WHICH WOULD SEEM TO BE FULLY NATURAL HAVE NOT UNFORTUNATELY BEEN JUSTIFIED. THE WESTERN STATES CONTINUE NOW, AS THEY DID FIVE YEARS AGO, TO INSIST ON THE SORT OF PROPOSALS WHICH, WHILE NOT GUARANTEEING AN EFFECTIVE REDUCTION IN ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, FOLLOW THE AIM OF ACHIEVING FROM THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES A DISPROPORTIONATELY LARGE REDUCTION AND OF ACHIEVING FOR THEMSELVES UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

6. THE WEST HAS NOT INTRODUCED ANY CHANGES WHATSOEVER INTO THIS POSITION WITH ITS PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL THIS YEAR. A CAREFUL AND OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THESE PROPOSALS GIVES GROUNDS TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THEM (FOR EXAMPLE, CONCERNING THE NECESSITY OF DEFINING PERIODS FOR COMPLETING THE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE), IN ALL THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS, THE WEST REMAINS ON ITS OLD POSITIONS. THUS, CONTRARY TO THE OPINION OF THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES, THE SOCIALIST STATES, AS WAS DEMONSTRATED IN A WELL ARGUED WAY IN THE STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA AT THE PLENARY MEETING ON 1 JUNE OF THIS YEAR, CANNOT CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL OF THIS YEAR AS A BASIS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MUTUALLY

ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS.

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7. THE QUESTION ARISES, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ON THE
THRESHOLD OF THE FIVE YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF OUR
NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM A REALLY FORWARD
DEVELOPMENT?

8. SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO CONVINCE OUR WESTERN
PARTNERS OF THE NECESSITY OF A MORE DECISIVE APPROACH,
TO ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE THE LIMITED NATURE OF THEIR SCHEME
AND TO SEEK TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT WHICH COULD IMMEDIATELY
GUARANTEE A SHARP TURNABOUT AWAY FROM THE SERIOUS MILITARY
CONFRONTATION TOWARDS EFFECTIVE MILITARY DETENTE?
EXPERIENCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOWS THAT THE NATO
COUNTRIES ARE NOT READY FOR SUCH A TURNABOUT AND THAT
THEY WILL NEED WHOLE YEARS IN ORDER TO MAKE EVEN THE
SMALLEST STEP TOWARDS A GENUINE REDUCTION OF ARMED
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. WHERE DO THEY MORE WILLINGLY
AND ENERGETICALLY WASTE THE TIME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
THAN FOR THE FURTHER INCREASE OF THEIR MILITARY
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POTENTIAL IN CENTRAL EUROPE?

9. THE FURTHER MAINTENANCE OF SUCH A SITUATION WOULD MORE AND MORE DIXCREDIT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IN THE EYES OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION AND WOULD UNDERMINE THE HOPES OF THE PEOPLES IN THE POSSIBILITY OF GUARANTEEING A STABLE PEACE IN EUROPE. MOREOVER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, UNLIKE THE NATO COUNTRIES, HAVE ALREADY FOR A LONG TIME NOT BEEN INCREASING THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ARE ALSO NOT INTENDING TO INCREASE THEM IN THE FUTURE, NEITHER BY ONE SOLDIER NOR BY ONE TANK, THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED SITUATION FOR WHOLE YEARS COULD RESULT IN THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES BEING REALLY DIMINISHED.

10. IN HIS STATEMENT OF 25 APRIL OF THIS YEAR THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, PRESIDENT OF THE PRAESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, L.I. BREZHNEV, STATED THAT "ALREADY FOR SEVERAL YEARS WE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA A SITUATION WHEREBY THE LEVEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WEST AND THE EAST IN EUROPE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY LOWERED - WITHOUT DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF ANY SIDE, BUT SO FAR WE HAVE ONLY MET IN REPLY ATTEMPTS BY THE WEST TO CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES TO THEIR ADVANTAGE... WE ARE READY TO DO EVERTHING WITHIN OUR POWER IN ORDER TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN ORDER TO WEAKEN THE MILITARY TENSION IN THIS REGION OF THE WORLD WHERE IT IS PARTICULARLY GREAT AND DANGEROUS." SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAVE DECLARED THEIR DESIRE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLEE IN THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN THE SPHERE OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
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IN CENTRAL EUROPE, INCLUDING FROM THE PLATFORM OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DISARMAMENT WHICH IS AT PRESENT GOING ON. THIS DESIRE BY THE SOCIALIST STATES IS DEMONSTRATED BY PRACTICAL ACTIONS.

11. AFTER NECESSARY CONSULTATIONS, WITH THE GOAL OF BRINGING A NEW IMPULSE TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND TRANSFERRING THEM TO THE WORKING OUT OF CONCRETE AGREEMENTS, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, POLAND, THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAVE TAKEN THE DECISION TO COME FORWARD WITH NEW, FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT PROPOSALS. THIS INITIATIVE, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CONSTRUCTIVE ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS, ESTABLISHES A REAL BASIS FOR THE WORKING OUT

OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, WHICH DO NOT DIMINISH
THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE STATES TAKING PART IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME - AND THIS HAS AN IMPORTANT
SIGNIFICANCE - THEY ELIMINATE THOSE SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES
FROM WHICH THE WESTERN SCHEME SUFFERS.

12. IN THE NAME OF THE CO-AUTHORS WE ARE OFFICIALLY INTRODUCING
FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE VIENNA TALKS
THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS. PERMIT ME TO READ THEM OUT:

"PROPOSALS BY THE SOCIALIST STATES DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF
ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE - 8 JUNE 1978.

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GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO ENSURE PROGRESS AT THE VIENNA
NEGOTIATIONS AND TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT,
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC,
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC ARE SUBMITTING NEW PROPOSALS.

IN DOING SO, THEY PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF AN
EQUAL-PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND FROM THE FACT OF THE
EXISTENCE OF AN APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES

IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AS WELL AS FROM THE NECESSITY TO UNDERTAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR DECREASING THE HIGH CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THIS AREA.

GIVEN THE AGREEMENT OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION AND TO THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES, THE SIDES COULD, DURING 3-4 YEARS, REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES
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BY AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL PERCENTAGE (THE WEST BY 91,000 MAN, AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES BY 105,000 MEN). IN THIS PROCESS ALL THE STATES-DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. AFTER THE REDUCTION, THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY STATES WOULD EACH HAVE IN THE REDUCTION AREA AN EQUAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH IN THEIR ARMED FORCES -- 900,000 MEN INCLUDING 700,000 IN GROUND FORCES.

THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN TWO STAGES.

THE FIRST STAGE

(1) IN THE FIRST STAGE, WHICH WILL BE OF A DURATION OF ONE YEAR, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY 7 PERCENT OF THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH (THE USSR BY APPROXIMATELY 30,000 MEN AND THE USA BY APPROXIMATELY 14,000 MEN).

(2) IN THIS CONTEXT, THE USSR WOULD REDUCE AND WITHDRAW TO ITS TERRITORY ONE ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS WITH SUPPORT AND SERVICE UNITS, TWO DIVISIONS AT FULL STRENGTH AND A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL TANK UNITS AND SUBUNITS, EQUIVALENT TO ONE TANK DIVISION, AS WELL AS 1,000 TANKS AND 250 MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES.

(3) THE USA WOULD WITHDRAW TO ITS TERRITORY TWO-THREE BRIGADES, WHILE THE REMAINING FORCES SUBJECT TO REDUCTION WOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN THE FORM OF OTHER UNITS AND SUBUNITS. IN ADDITION, THE USA WOULD REDUCE 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS, 36 "PERSHING" MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND 54 F-4 DELIVERY AIRCRAFT.

(4) AFTER THE REDUCTION OF THE USA AND USSR ARMAMENTS
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REFERRED TO IN THE PRESENT PROPOSALS, THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH

OF THE NUCLEAR WARHEADS, THE QUANTIFY OF "PERSHING" MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND F-4 DELIVERY AIRCRAFT OF THE USA AS WELL AS THE QUANTITY OF SOVIET TANKS WOULD BE LIMITED AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL.

(5) UPON SIGNING THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD EXCHANGE LISTS SPECIFYING THE ACTUAL IDENTIFICATION, THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND THE LOCATION OF THE FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUBUNITS SUBJECT TO REDUCTION.

(6) IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT, THE STATES OTHER THAN THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION IN A SECOND STAGE, TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE COURSE OF THE 2-3 YEARS AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE FIRST STAGE.

(7) THE SCOPE OF THE REDUCTION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH STATE INDIVIDUALLY AND WOULD BE DETERMINED FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE APPROXIMATELY PROPORTIONATE TO THE TOTAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES.

(8) COLLECTIVE LEVELS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHIN THE LIMITS INDICATED ABOVE AND UNDER THE OBSERVANCE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES:

-- FIRSTLY, THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTIONS WHATSOEVER, WOULD BE COVERED BY THESE COLLECTIVE LEVELS, I.E., NATIONAL LIMITATIONS WOULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF ANY OF THE STATES, INCLUDING THE USSR AND THE USA;

-- SECONDLY, IN THE CASE OF A POSSIBLE UNILATERAL REDUCTION IN THE FORCES OF ANY OF THE STATES, NO OTHER STATE PARTICIPATING IN THE REDUCTION AND BELONGING TO THE SAME GROUPING

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WOULD BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE ITS FORCES BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT

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OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN REDUCED BY ITS ALLIES, AND MUST NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, AS A RESULT OF SUCH AN INCREASE, REESTABLISH OR, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, EXCEED THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH IT HAD BEFORE THE REDUCTION.

-- THIRDLY, THE POST-REDUCTION RESIDUAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF EACH STATE COULD NOT BE RAISED THROUGH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MILITARY POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY CIVILIANS IN PEACE-TIME.

(9) ALL PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD UNDERTAKE A REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE WOULD CARRY IT OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT ELABORATED AS A RESULT OF THE SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS, OR, IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE METHOD OF REDUCTION OF FORCES ESTABLISHED FOR THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT. IF THIS METHOD WERE TO DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY
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FROM THAT ENVISAGED FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA, THESE TWO STATES-PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONSIDER THEMSELVES AS NO LONGER BOUND BY THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THEM IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT.

SECOND STAGE

(1) DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SECOND STAGE, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY 40 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED.

(2) DURING THE SECOND-THIRD YEARS THE ABOVE-MENTIONED STATES WOULD REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES BY THE REMAINING 60 PERCENT.

(3) IN THE SECOND STAGE, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD FURTHER REDUCE A QUANTITY OF FORCES WHICH, IN PERCENTAGE TERMS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE FIRST STAGE, WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE PERCENTAGE OF THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF ALL THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FORM THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY-POLITICAL GROUPING.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

(1) AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION IN THE FIRST AND SECOND STAGES, IT WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED TO CARRY OUT A RELOCATION OF THE REMAINING INDIVIDUAL MILITARY FORMATIONS WITHIN THE REDUCTIONS AREA AT THE DISCRETION OF ONE OR ANOTHER STATE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE THE OVERALL QUANTITY OF GROUND FORCE FORMATIONS AND UNITS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO THE REDUCTION.

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(2) ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES - DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHICH ARE NOT DEALT WITH IN THESE PROPOSALS REMAIN AS PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED"

THESE ARE THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

13. PERMIT ME, MR CHAIRMAN, TO GIVE NOW ON BEHALF OF THE CO-AUTHORS SOME EXPLANATIONS CONCERNING THE PROPOSALS JUST PRESENTED.

14. ABOVE ALL, AS IS CLEAR FROM THEIR CONTENTS, A WHOLE SERIES OF EXTREMELY IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO THE SOLUTION OF WHICH THE WESTERN STATES HAVE ASSIGNED PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS IS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.

15. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DECLARE THEIR AGREEMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT, AS AN OUTCOME OF THE REDUCTION, OF COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY IN CENTRAL EUROPE - OF 900,000 MEN, INCLUDING 700,000 GROUND FORCES EACH.

16. IN THE SECOND PLACE, WE SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT THE REDUCTION IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES TO REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES WHILE THERE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED

AN UPPER LIMIT ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE PERSONNEL OF
AIR FORCES.

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17. IN THE THIRD PLACE, WE GIVE OUR AGREEMENT IN THE FIRST
STAGE TO THE SELECTIVE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS
INCLUDING SUCH TYPES AS HAD BEEN NAMED BY THE WESTERN SIDE
FOR REDUCTION IN THE FIRST PHASE BY THE UNITED STATES AND
THE SOVIET UNION.

18. IN THE FOURTH PLACE, THE USSR IS PREPARED TO CARRY OUT
THE REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES IN THE FIRST STAGE BY THOSE UNITS
WHICH WERE PROPOSED BY THE WEST, THAT IS, BY DIVISIONS.

19. IN THE FIFTH PLACE, BOTH IN OUR FIRST STAGE PROPOSALS
AS IN THE WESTERN ONE, THERE IS FORESEEN THE SAME
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE QUANTITY OF THE REDUCED AMERICAN
AND SOVIET FORCES, THAT IS 1:2.

20. SOME OTHER PROPOSALS OF THE WESTERN STATES ARE ALSO
CONSTRUCTIVELY TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION BY US.

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21. THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AT THE SAME TIME PRESERVE THOSE FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT ELEMENTS, ON WHICH OUR POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN BASED, AND WITHOUT WHICH THERE COULD BE PROVIDED NO REALLY EFFECTIVE AND EQUIVALENT REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE CHIEF ELEMENTS OF THIS ARE THE FOLLOWING:

22. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE RECOGNITION AS A STARTING POINT FOR THE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES OF THE REAL FACT THAT IN CENTRAL EUROPE THERE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHMENT AND EXISTS AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY.

23. IN THE SECOND PLACE, THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES ON THE BASIS OF A SIMILAR METHOD OF THEIR REDUCTION.

24. IN THE THIRD PLACE, THE PROVISION THAT ALL STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, IN SUCH A WAY THAT EACH OF THEM MUST MAKE ITS OWN INDIVIDUAL AND EQUIVALENT CONTRIBUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL.

25. IN THE FOURTH PLACE, THE NECESSITY FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS BY ALL STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE UNDERSTANDING, IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, THAT THE METHOD OF THEIR REDUCTION AND THE CONCRETE VOLUME AND COMPOSITION WOULD BE DEFINED IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR EACH OF THE TWO STAGES.

26. IN THE FIFTH PLACE, THE CONSISTENT AND STRICT OBSERVATION
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OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY WHICH HAS FOUND ITS REFLECTION IN PARTICULAR IN THE FACT THAT HAVING AGREED WITH THE GOALS OF BRINGING TOGETHER THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES WITH THE WESTERN IDEA OF THE COLLECTIVE LEVELS OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO MILITARY-POLITICAL ALLIANCES, WE HAVE FORESEEN THAT SUCH A LEVEL WOULD BE ESTABLISHED ACCORDING TO THE SAME CONDITIONS FOR ALL THE PARTICIPANTS OF THESE GROUPINGS WITHOUT EXCEPTION, INCLUDING THE USSR AND USA.

27. AT THE SAME TIME WE WOULD LIKE TO REMARK THAT OUR NEW PROPOSALS CORRECT SERIOUS INSUFFICIENCIES IN THE

WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS, WHICH COULD UNDERMINE THE EXISTENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF A FUTURE AGREEMENT. AS AN EXAMPLE, IT IS POSSIBLE TO CITE THE FOLLOWING: BEARING IN MIND THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT, IN AN OUTCOME OF THE REDUCTION, OF COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVELS FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE FOR, AT THE SAME TIME, SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY ALLOW FOR ANY DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATE TO RE-ESTABLISH OR TO SURPASS THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH IT HAD BEFORE THE REDUCTION.

28. MR CHAIRMAN, THE NEW PROPOSALS TABLED BY US TODAY ARE THUS THE CLEAR AND PRECISE ANSWER OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE COUNTRIES OF NATO OF 19 APRIL OF THIS YEAR. HOWEVER, THEIR PRINCIPAL SIGNIFICANCE LIES IN THE FACT THAT THEY KEEP IN VIEW THE PRACTICAL ROAD TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND CAN UNDOUBTEDLY BRING A TURNING POINT TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, HAVING CREATED A GENUINELY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASE OF A COMPROMISE CHARACTER FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT. IF THE WESTERN STATES

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POSITIVELY ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO OUR NEW PROPOSALS, THEN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED WITHOUT DELAY TO EMBARK ON THE WORKING OUT OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THEM.

29. WE HOPE THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS WILL ATTENTIVELY STUDY OUR NEW INITIATIVE, WHICH SHOWS THE GOODWILL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES AND THE INTEREST THEY AVE IN THE MOST RAPID ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT, AND WILL TAKE THESE AS THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

END TEXT. RESOR

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